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Abstract
We present an evolutionary model of a population interacting in repeated Prisoner's Dilemma. Each
type is characterized by the number of steps he looks ahead, and each agent has an independent
probability to observe the opponent's type. We show that if this probability is not too close to 0
or 1, then the evolutionary process admits a stable outcome, in which the population includes a
mixture of naive agents who look 1 step ahead, and moderately sophisticated agents who look 3
steps ahead. Moreover, this outcome is unique under the additional assumption that agents present
reciprocity at early stages of the interaction.
KEYWORDS: bounded forward-looking, evolutionary stability, Prisoner's Dilemma. JEL Clas-
siﬁcation: C73, D03.
1 Introduction
Experimental evidence suggests that people look only few stages ahead and use backward
induction reasoning to a limited extent. For example, players usually defect only at the
last couple of stages when playing a ﬁnitely repeated Prisoner's Dilemma game (see, e.g.,
Selten and Stoecker (1986)) and Centipede game (McKelvey and Palfrey (1995); Nagel and
Tang (1998)), and they ignore future opportunities that are more than 1-2 steps ahead when
interacting in sequential bargaining (Neelin, Sonnenschein, and Spiegel (1988)). A second
stylized fact is the heterogeneity of the population: some people systematically look fewer
∗I would like to express my deep gratitude to Itai Arieli, Vince Crawford, Eddie Dekel, Eric Mohlin, Ariel
Rubinstein, Peyton Young, seminar participants at Birmingham, Oxford, and University College London,
and workshop participants in ﬁfth Transatlantic Theory Workshop at Northwestern University, for many
useful comments, discussions, and ideas.
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C D
C A,A 0,A+1
D A+1,0 1,1
Tab. 1: Payoﬀ at the symmetric stage game Prisoner's Dilemma (A > 3.15).
steps than others (see, e.g., Johnson, Camerer, Sen, and Rymon (2002)).1
These observations raise two related evolutionary puzzles. The ﬁrst puzzle is why people only
look few steps ahead. In many games, the ability to look one more step than your opponent
gives a substantial advantage. As the cognitive cost of an additional step is moderate in
relatively-simple games (see, e.g., Camerer (2003, Section 5.3.5)), it is puzzling why there
has not been an arms race in which people learn to look more steps ahead throughout the
evolutionary process (the so called red queen eﬀect; Robson (2003)). The second puzzle is
how the naive people, who systematically look fewer steps ahead, survive.
In this paper we present an evolutionary model where agents, who diﬀer in their forward
looking ability, play repeated Prisoner's Dilemma. We characterize a stable heterogeneous
population of naive agents (who look 1 step ahead) and moderately sophisticated agents (who
look 3 steps ahead). Moreover, we show that under an additional assumption of reciprocal
behavior at early stages of the interaction, this is the unique stable population.
In each generation agents from a large population are randomly matched and each couple
plays (without rematching) repeated Prisoner's Dilemma. The stage payoﬀs are described in
Table 1: mutual cooperation (both players play C) yields both players A, mutual defection
(both players playD) gives 1, and if a single player defects, he obtains A+1 and his opponent
gets 0. The length of the interactions at each generation, T, has a geometric distribution
with parameter λ. In what follows, we assume that mutual cooperation is suﬃciently eﬃcient
(A > 3), and that the interaction is long enough (λ close to 1).2
Each agent in our model has a type in the set {L1, L2, ..., LM , L∞} that determines how
many steps he looks ahead (results are independent of M , given that M ≥ 3). Agents of
type L∞ are informed about the realized length of the interaction before the game begins.
An agent of type Lk is informed about the realized length k periods before the end (after
playing at stage T − k). We interpret this information structure to stem from bounded
forward-lookingness: type Lk becomes aware of the realized ﬁnal period and its strategic
1 Similar stylized facts are also observed with respect to the number of strategic iterations that players
use in static games, as suggested by the cognitive hierarchy (or level-k) models (see, e.g., Stahl and Wilson
(1994); Nagel (1995); Costa-Gomes, Crawford, and Broseta (2001); Camerer, Ho, and Chong (2004)).
2 In order to simplify the presentation of the results, we assumed that: (1) defection yields the same
additional payoﬀ (relative to cooperation) regardless of the opponent's strategy, and (2) all interactions at
each generation has the same length. The results remain qualitatively similar also without these assumptions.
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backward-induction implications only k rounds before the end.
We assume that types are partially observable in the following way (similar to Dekel,
Ely, and Yilankaya (2007)): before the interaction begins, each agent has an independent
probability p to observe his opponent's type.3 Informally, this can be interpreted as an
opportunity to observe opponent's past behavior, or to observe a trait that is correlated
with the forward-looking ability. The total payoﬀ of an agent of type Lk is the undiscounted
sum of payoﬀs in the repeated Prisoner's Dilemma minus an arbitrarily small cost that is
increasing in k (a marginal cost for having a better forward-looking ability).
We capture the stable points of the dynamic evolutionary process by adapting the notion
of evolutionarily stable strategy (ESS, Maynard-Smith (1974)) to a setup with diﬀerent types.
In such a setup, the state of the population is described by a conﬁguration - a pair consisting
of a distribution of types and the (possibly mixed) strategy that each type uses in the game.
A conﬁguration is evolutionarily stable if any suﬃciently small group of mutants who invades
the population is outperformed by the incumbents in the post-entry population.4
Our ﬁrst result shows that if p is not too close to 0 and 1 (and this interval is increasing
in A), then there exists an evolutionarily stable conﬁguration, which includes two kinds of
players: (1) naive agents of type L1 who only begin defecting at the last stage (their pro-
portion increases in both p and A), (2) moderately sophisticated agents of type L3: usually
they defect two stages before the end, unless they observe that their opponent is sophisti-
cated, and, in this case, they begin defecting one stage earlier. Stability relies on the balance
between the direct disadvantage of naive agents (defecting too late), and the indirect ad-
vantage - when naivety is observed by a moderately sophisticated opponent, it serves as a
commitment device that allows an additional round of mutual cooperation. Higher types
(L4 or more) cannot invade the population because L3's behavior remains the best-reply also
when being informed earlier about the realized length of the interaction.
As common in evolutionary models, this environment admits other stable conﬁgurations.
Our second result characterizes an additional assumption - early-reciprocity, under which,
this is the unique stable conﬁguration.5 Speciﬁcally, we assume that as long as an agent is
uninformed about the realized length of the interaction he must: (1) be nice - never defect
before his opponent, and (2) retaliate - defect if the opponent defected in the previous
stage. Two examples for such heuristics are tit-for-tat (defect if the opponent defected in
3 Results remain the same if agents were able to observe only lower opponents' type (see remark 2).
4 The mutants achieve the same payoﬀ if they are equivalent to the incumbents: have the same distri-
bution of types and play the same on-equilibrium path. If they are not equivalent, we require the mutants
to obtain a strictly lower payoﬀ.
5 In addition, we reﬁne evolutionary-stability by requiring stable conﬁgurations to satisfy properness
(Myerson (1978)). This restricts the incumbents to use reasonable strategies against external mutants.
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the previous stage) and grim (defect if the opponent ever defected in the past).
The plausibility of this assumption relies on Axelrod (1984)'s ﬁndings that reciprocal
behavior is very successful in tournaments of inﬁnitely repeated Prisoner's Dilemma. In
addition, a support for this assumption and for the predicted behavior in our model, is given
in experiments that study behavior in ﬁnitely-repeated Prisoner's Dilemma. Selten and
Stoecker (1986) study games with 10 rounds and show: (1) if any player defected, then almost
always both players defect at all remaining stages, (2) usually there is mutual cooperation
in the ﬁrst 6 rounds, and (3) players begin defecting in the last 1-4 rounds.6 Johnson,
Camerer, Sen, and Rymon (2002)'s ﬁndings suggest that bounded forward-lookingness is
the main cause for this behavior.
It is interesting to note that stable conﬁgurations are very diﬀerent when p is close to
0 or 1. In both cases (assuming early-reciprocity), stable conﬁgurations must include L∞
agents who, when facing other L∞ agents, defect at all stages. When p is close to 0, types
are too rarely observed, and the indirect advantage of naive agents is too weak. When p
is close to 1, there is an arms race between sophisticated agents who observe each other:
each such agent wishes to defect one stage before his opponent.
Our formal analysis deals only with repeated Prisoner's Dilemma. It is straightforward
to extend the results to other games in which looking far ahead decreases eﬃciency. One
example for such games is centipede (Rosenthal (1981)), which can represent sequential
gift exchange. Such interactions are important both in primitive hunter-gatherer societies
(see, e.g., Haviland, Prins, and Walrath (2007), p. 440), as well as in modern societies.
We conclude by brieﬂy surveying the related literature. Geanakoplos and Gray (1991)
study complex sequential decision problems and describe circumstances under which looking
too far ahead in a decision tree leads to poor choices. Stahl (1993); Stennek (2000) and
Mohlin (2012) present evolutionary models of bounded strategic reasoning (level-k), which
are related to our model when p = 0 or p = 1. This paper is novel in introducing partial
observability in this setup, and showing that it yields qualitative diﬀerent results. Crawford
(2003) studies zero-sum games with cheap talk and show that naive and sophisticated
agents may co-exist and obtain the same payoﬀ. Finally, Mengel (2012) assumes bounded
forward looking, and demonstrates in an interaction of repeated Prisoner's Dilemma that
it can induce cooperative behavior while both myopic play and unlimited forward looking
behavior only induce defections.
6 In the experiment subjects engaged in 25 sequences (super-games) of repeated Prisoner's Dilemma.
The above results describe the behavior of subjects in the last 13 sequences (after the initial 12 sequences in
which players are inexperienced and their actions are noisier). See similar results in Andreoni and Miller
(1993); Cooper, DeJong, Forsythe, and Ross (1996); Bruttel, Güth, and Kamecke (2012).
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The paper is structured as follows. Section 2 presents our model. In Section 3 we show the
stability of the conﬁguration in which L1 and L3 co-exist. In Section 4 we prove uniqueness
under the assumption of early-reciprocity, and characterize the stable conﬁgurations for low
and high p-s. Appendix A compares our notion of stability with Dekel, Ely, and Yilankaya
(2007), and show that our results are similar also with their notion, and Appendix B includes
the formal proofs.
2 Model
2.1 Payoﬀs, Strategies and Types
We consider a large population in which at each generation agents are randomly matched, and
each pair of agents play the repeated Prisoner's Dilemma with a geometric random length:
T. The stage game includes two actions: {C,D}. The stage-payoﬀs are described in Table
1. As is standard in the evolutionary literature, this payoﬀ is interpreted as representing
success or ﬁtness. To simplify the presentation of the results we assume that: (1) the
interaction lasts at least 3 rounds - T−2∼Geo (λ); and (2) at each generation all interactions
have the same length (while lengths in diﬀerent generations are independent). The results
remain qualitatively the same without these assumptions.
Agents in the population diﬀer in their forward-looking ability, which is captured by their
type. Fix an arbitrary integer M ≥ 4, and let L = {L1, ..., LM , L∞} be the set of types.7
An agent of type Lk is informed about the realized length of the interaction after playing at
round T− k, or at the beginning of the interaction if T < k. We dub agents as uninformed
before they receive the signal about the realized length, and as informed afterwords.
Remark 1. We set L1 to be the minimal type in the model. However, our results are robust to
this choice. Speciﬁcally, if the minimal type in L were Lk (for some k ∈ N including k = 0)
instead of L1, then all our results would hold for a shifted unique stable conﬁguration,
(µ∗, b∗), where L1 is replaced by Lk and L3 is replaced by Lk+2.
Let c : L → R+ be a strictly increasing function satisfying c (L1) = 0, and let δ > 0.
Agents of type Lk bear a cognitive cost of δ · c (Lk). The payoﬀ of the repeated game is the
undiscounted sum of the stage payoﬀs minus the cognitive cost. In what follows we focus on
the case of: (1) arbitrarily low cognitive costs - suﬃciently small δ, (2) long interaction - λ
is close enough to 1, and (3) eﬃcient mutual cooperation - A is large enough (A > 3.2 for
stability, and A > 4.6 for uniqueness).
7 The results also hold for M = 3 but this make the notations of the proof more cumbersome.
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Following Dekel, Ely, and Yilankaya (2007), we assume that before the interaction begins
each player observes the type of his opponent with probability p (and gets no information
about his opponent's type with probability 1 − p), independently of the event that his
opponent observes his type.8 We use the term stranger to describe an opponent whose type
is not observed.
Remark 2. In some environments it might be plausible to assume that agents only iden-
tify lower opponent's types (see, Mohlin (2012)). All of our results remain the same with
asymmetric type observability, where the informative signal (obtained with probability p) is:
1. The opponent's exact type, if it is strictly lower than the agent's type.
2. If the opponent's type is weakly higher, then the agent only observes this fact.
A history of the game of length t ≥ 0 is a triple (Lk′ , l, (ai, a−i)t)where: (1) Lk′ ∈ L ∪ φ
describes the signal about the opponent's type (φ denotes a stranger); (2) l ∈ {1, ...,M,∞};
l =∞ describes the case of an uninformed agent - the number of remaining stages (dubbed,
the horizon) is unknown, and l < ∞ describes the length of a known horizon; and (3)
(ai, a−i)
t ∈ {C ×D}t describe the t action-proﬁles that were observed so far in the game.
Let Ht denote the set of all histories of length t, and let H = ∪t∈NHt be the set of all
histories. A pure strategy (resp., behavioral strategy) is a function b : H → {C,D} (resp.,
β : H → ∆ ({C,D}) from the set of histories to the set of pure (resp., mixed) actions.
2.2 Conﬁgurations
Following the indirect evolutionary approach (Güth and Yaari (1992)) we present a reduced-
form static analysis of a dynamic process that describes the evolution of types.9 This process
can be interpreted as either: (1) biological process - types are genetically determined, and
payoﬀ is the number of oﬀspring; and (2) learning and imitation process - an agent's type
describes the way he perceives strategic interactions; once in a while an agent may decide to
change his strategic framework and imitate the type of a more successful agent.
Given a distribution of types µ ∈ ∆ (L) let C (µ) ⊆ L denote the support of µ (types
with positive frequency). Types in C (µ) are called incumbents, and types outside C (µ) are
called external mutants. The state of the population is described by a conﬁguration - a pair
consisting of a distribution of types and their strategy proﬁle. Formally:
8 The results remain qualitatively similar if the signal structure is slightly altered by: (1) a small positive
correlation with the opponent's signal, or (2) a small probability that the informative signal is incorrect.
9 The indirect approach was mainly used to study evolution of preferences. See Frenkel, Heller, and Teper
(2012) for a previous adaptation of this approach to study evolution of cognitive biases.
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Deﬁnition 1. Conﬁguration (µ, β) is a pair where µ ∈ ∆ (L) is a distribution of types, and
β = (βk)k∈C(µ) is the proﬁle of behavioral strategies of the incumbents.
Remark 3. Note that a conﬁguration also determines the behavior against external mutants.
In Appendix A we show that our results remain qualitatively similar also with Dekel, Ely,
and Yilankaya (2007)'s alternative notion, in which h the state of the population determines
only the strategies that are used against incumbents.
Next, we deﬁne the mixture of two conﬁgurations as follows:
Deﬁnition 2. Let (µ, β) and (µ′, β′) be conﬁgurations, and let 0 <  < 1. The mixture
conﬁguration
(
µ˜, β˜
)
= (1− ) · (µ, β) +  · (µ′, β′) is: µ˜ = (1− ) · µ+  · µ′, and:
∀k ∈ C (µ˜) , β˜k = (1− ) · µ (Lk) · βk +  · µ
′ (Lk) · β′k
(1− ) · µ (Lk) +  · µ′ (Lk) .
When  is small we interpret (1− ) · (µ, β)+  · (µ′, β′) as a post-entry conﬁguration after
incumbents in state (µ, β) are invaded by  mutants with conﬁguration (µ′, β′). Finally, we
deﬁne two conﬁgurations as equivalent if they have the same distribution and they induce
the same observed play. Formally:
Deﬁnition 3. Conﬁgurations (µ, β) and (µ′, β′) are equivalent ((µ, β) ≈ (µ′, β′)) if: (1)
µ = µ′, and (2) for each pair of incumbents Lk, Lk′ ∈ C (µ), the observed play when type Lk
plays against type Lk′ is the same in both conﬁgurations.
Note that that following the invasion of  mutants, the incumbents in each of two equiv-
alent conﬁgurations may act diﬀerently when facing these mutants.
3 Evolutionary Stability
3.1 Deﬁnition
In a model without types, the state of the population is described by a strategy. A strategy is
neutrally (resp., evolutionarily) stable if any suﬃciently small group of mutants who invades
the population and plays an arbitrary strategy would achieve a weakly (strictly) lower payoﬀ
than the incumbents. Formally:
Deﬁnition 4. (Maynard-Smith (1974); Maynard Smith (1982)) Strategy σ ∈ Σ is neutrally
(resp., evolutionarily) stable if for any strategy σ′ (resp., σ′ 6= σ) there exists σ′ ∈ (0, 1)
such that for every 0 <  < σ′ : u (σ, σ
′ + (1− )σ) ≥ u (σ′, σ′ + (1− )σ) . (resp.,
u (σ, σ′ + (1− )σ) > u (σ′, σ′ + (1− )σ)).
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In what follows we extend the notion of evolutionary stability from strategies to conﬁgu-
rations. Given two conﬁgurations (µ, β) and (µ′, β′) deﬁne u ((µ, β) , (µ′, β′)) as the expected
payoﬀ of a player from population (µ, β) who plays against an opponent from population
(µ′, β′) (and the type of each player is observed with independent probability p). A con-
ﬁguration is neutrally (evolutionarily) stable if any suﬃciently small group of mutants who
invades the population would obtain a weakly (strictly) lower payoﬀ than the incumbents in
the post-entry population. Formally:
Deﬁnition 5. Conﬁguration (µ, β) is neutrally (resp., evolutionarily) stable if for any con-
ﬁguration (µ′, β′) (resp., any (µ′, β′) 6≈ (µ, β)) there exists σ′ ∈ (0, 1) such that ∀ 0 <  < σ′ :
u ((µ, β) ,  (µ′, β′) + (1− ) (µ, β)) ≥ u ((µ′, β′) ,  (µ′, β′) + (1− ) (µ, β))
(resp., u ((µ, β) ,  (µ′, β′) + (1− ) (µ, β)) > u ((µ′, β′) ,  (µ′, β′) + (1− ) (µ, β))).
Remark 4. Note that:
1. Evolutionarily stable conﬁgurations are only weakly stable against invasions of equiv-
alent mutants.
2. Deﬁnition 5 is closely related to Maynard Smith (1982)'s Deﬁnition 4 in two ways:
(a) When the set of types is a singleton, then Deﬁnition 5 and Deﬁnition 4 coincide.
(b) Consider a two-player meta-game in which each player chooses a type and a
strategy for that type. Note that a mixed meta-strategy in this game is a
conﬁguration. A symmetric strategy proﬁle in this meta-game is a neutrally
stable strategy if and only if it is a neutrally stable conﬁguration.10
3. Similar to the standard setup without types (see, Taylor and Jonker (1978)), neutral
stability implies (Lyapunov) dynamic stability: no small change in the population can
take it away from a neutral stable conﬁguration in any payoﬀ-monotonic dynamics.
It is well known that any neutrally stable strategy is a Nash equilibrium. Similarly (see
Proposition 2 in Appendix B.1) strategy proﬁle β in a neutrally stable conﬁguration (µ, β)
is: (1) balanced - all incumbents obtain the same payoﬀ, and (2) a BayesNash equilibrium
in the Bayesian game with distribution µ.
10 An evolutionarily stable conﬁguration may be only a neutrally stable strategy in the meta-game as
meta-strategies that only deviate oﬀ-equilibrium path yield the same payoﬀ as the incumbents in the
post-entry population.
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3.2 Stability Result
Our ﬁrst result characterizes an evolutionarily stable conﬁguration, (µ∗, b∗), in which naive
players (type L1) and moderately sophisticated players (type L3) co-exist. Let the conﬁgu-
ration (µ∗, b∗) be deﬁned as follows:
1. The population includes only types L1 and L3 with the following frequencies:
µ∗ (L1) =
p · (A− 1)− 1 + δ · c (L3)
p · (A− 1) , µ
∗ (L3) =
1− δ · c (L3)
p · (A− 1) .
2. Uninformed agents play grim: defect if and only if the opponent has ever defected.
3. Informed L1 agents defect at the last stage. Informed L3 players:
(a) Against an observed type diﬀerent from L1: defect at the last three stages.
(b) Against strangers and observed L1: Follow grim at horizon=3, and defect at the
last two stages.
Our ﬁrst results shows that (µ∗, b∗) is stable if p is not too close to 0 or 1.
Theorem 1. Let A
(A−1)2 < p <
A−1
A
, let δ > 0 be suﬃciently small and let λ < 1 be suﬃciently
large. Then (µ∗, b∗) is evolutionarily stable.11
The formal proof appears in Appendix B.2. In what follows we brieﬂy sketch its outline.
First, we show that b∗ is a BayesNash equilibrium (given µ∗), and that following grim till
the last three rounds is also a best reply for informed mutants of higher types (if p is not too
close to 1). Next, we show that (µ∗, b∗) is balanced. In order to show this, we compare the
ﬁtness of L1 and L3 agents against diﬀerent opponents. L1 agents succeed more against an
observing L3 opponent (who observed their type), because their observed naivety induces an
additional round of mutual cooperation. L3 agents achieve a better payoﬀ in the two other
cases: against naive opponents and against an unobserving sophisticated opponent. This
implies that there is a unique level of µ (L1) that balances the payoﬀ of the two kinds of
players (if p is not too close to 0).
Finally, we use these two properties to show resistance to mutations. If  more players of
type L1 (L3) join the populations, then due to the previous arguments, they would have a
strictly lower payoﬀ than the incumbents (on average). Mutants of type L2 are outperformed
due to their inability to defect one stage earlier against an observed type L3. Mutants of
types L4 or more are outperformed due to their higher cognitive costs.
11 Note that the interval A
(A−1)2 < p <
A−1
A is increasing in A, it converges to the entire interval [0, 1] in
the limit A→∞,and it is non-empty for each A > 3.2.
4 Uniqueness 10
4 Uniqueness
Similar to other models of repeated interactions our environment admits additional stable
conﬁgurations. In this section we show that if we further assume that uninformed agents
present reciprocal behavior, then (µ∗, b∗) is the unique stable conﬁguration.
4.1 Reciprocal Behavior
In an early-reciprocal strategy uninformed agents: (1) never defect ﬁrst (nice), and (2)
defect if the opponent has defected in the last stage (retaliate). Formally:
Deﬁnition 6. Behavioral strategy β is an early-reciprocal strategy if :
1. β
(·,∞, (ai, a−i)t) = C if aτ−i = C for each τ ≤ t (nice); and
2. β
(·,∞, (ai, a−i)t) = D if at−i = D (retaliate).
As discussed in the introduction, reciprocal behavior includes a family of heuristics (such
as, tit-for-tat and grim), which are very successful in experimental and simulated plays
of inﬁnitely repeated Prisoner's Dilemma (e.g., Axelrod (1984)). In what follows we assume
that all agents (both incumbents and mutants) are limited to playing only early-reciprocal
strategies (dubbed, early-reciprocity assumption).
4.2 Properness Reﬁnement
Even with the early-reciprocity assumption, the interaction admits additional evolutionarily
stable conﬁgurations. One such conﬁguration is described in the following example.
Example. Consider the conﬁguration that assigns mass 1 to L∞ agents who defect at
all stages against any observed opponent's type. One can see that this conﬁguration is
evolutionarily stable. However, the stability relies on the incumbents defecting at all stages
against naive mutants (L1). Such a strategy is strictly dominated by an alternative strategy
that cooperates for the ﬁrstM−2 stages against naive opponents (due to the early-reciprocity
assumption). Thus, in the long run, as a response to recurrent entrees of naive mutants,
incumbents are expected to evolve into cooperating at the ﬁrst stages of the game when
facing naive opponents, and the stability of the conﬁguration will be lost.
Motivated by this example, we reﬁne evolutionary stability by requiring properness (My-
erson (1978)). We begin by formally deﬁning properness in this setup. A conﬁguration is
interior if every combination of type and pure strategy has a positive probability. With some
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abuse of notation: (1) we denote by Lk also the distribution that assigns mass 1 to type Lk;
and (2) we consider the behavioral strategy β as a mixed strategy, and denote by β (b) the
probability of the pure strategy b.
Deﬁnition 7. Conﬁguration (µ, β) is interior if for each types Lk ∈ L and for each pure
early-reciprocal strategy b: (1) µ (Lk) > 0, and (2) β (b) > 0.
Given  > 0, an interior strategy conﬁguration (µ, β) is -proper if for every type LkLk′ ∈
L and every pure early-reciprocal strategy bk, bk′ :
u ((Lk, bk) , (µ, β)) < u ((Lk′ , bk′) , (µ, β)) ⇒ µ (Lk) · β (bk) ≤  · µ (Lk′) · β (bk′) .
A conﬁguration is proper if it is the limit of some -proper equilibria when → 0.
Deﬁnition 8. Conﬁguration (µ, β) is proper, if there exists a sequence (n > 0)n≥1 → 0
and a sequence of n-proper interior conﬁgurations (µ
n, βn) such that µn →n→∞ µ, and if
µ (Lk) > 0 then β
n
k →n→∞ βk.
Remark 5. Note that:
1. The conﬁguration in the example above is not proper because in any interior conﬁgu-
ration, cooperating in the ﬁrst M − 2 stages strictly dominates early defection against
observed L1. This implies that always defecting against type L1 cannot be played with
positive probability in a proper conﬁguration.
2. It is immediate to see that in every proper conﬁguration (µ, β) the proﬁle β is a
balanced BayesNash equilibrium.
3. Deﬁnition 8 is closely related to Myerson's (1978) deﬁnition of proper equilibrium:
(a) If there is a single type, then Deﬁnition 5 and Myerson's deﬁnition coincide.
(b) Consider again the two-player meta-game in which each player chooses a type
and an early reciprocal strategy. A symmetric (mixed) strategy proﬁle in this
meta-game is a proper equilibrium if and only if it is a proper conﬁguration.
4. In the proof of our uniqueness result (Theorem 2) we only use a weaker property
that is implied by properness: the requirement that the strategy that an incumbent
plays against an external mutant must be a best-reply to some strategy of the external
mutant, which is best-reply to the incumbent conﬁguration.
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A conﬁguration is a proper naturally (evolutionarily) stable if it is both proper and nat-
urally (evolutionarily) stable. van Damme (1987) showed for normal-form games without
types that evolutionary stability implies properness. In our setup, this does not hold, be-
cause we weakened evolutionary stability by allowing equivalent mutants to fare the same
as the incumbents. Thus, we have to slightly enhance evolutionary stability by explicitly
require properness.
4.3 Uniqueness Result
It is straightforward to show that (µ∗, b∗) is proper (Prop. 3, proved in Appendix B.3). Our
next result shows that with the early-reciprocity assumption any proper neutrally stable
conﬁguration is equivalent to (µ∗, b∗).12
Theorem 2. Let A > 4.6, A
(A−1)2 < p <
A−1
A
, δ > 0 be suﬃciently small, λ < 1 be suﬃciently
large, and assume early-reciprocity. Then if (µ, β) is a proper neutrally stable conﬁguration,
then it is equivalent to (µ∗, b∗).13
The sketch of the proof is as follows (see Appendix B.4 for the formal proof). First,
observe that a conﬁguration with a single type is not stable: (1) if the type is L∞, then the
entire population defects all the time, and mutants of type L1 induce cooperation against
them and, in doing so, outperform the incumbents; and (2) if the type is Lk 6= L∞, then
mutants of type L∞ can invade the population. Let Lk1 be the smallest (naive) type in the
population. Then, it is immediate to see that type Lk1 must always defect when the horizon
is at most k1, and all other types must defect when the horizon is at most k1 + 1.
The next step is to show that a large fraction of the non-naive population must cooperate
at all horizons larger than k1 + 1 when facing strangers. Otherwise, a small increase in the
frequency of the naive players (type Lk1) would improve their ﬁtness relative to the non-naive
agents (as many non-naive agents defect too early against unobserved naive opponents), and
this implies instability. The fact that this fraction is so large implies that if there are non-
naive players who defect at earlier horizons than k1 + 1 against strangers, then: (1) the large
fraction who defects at horizon k1 + 1 against strangers must belong to type Lk1+1, and (2)
all the remaining non-naive players must defect at horizon k1 + 2 against strangers. This
characterization allows us to ﬁnd the unique distribution of types that satisﬁes the balance
12 The assumption A > 4.6 is required to have uniqueness in the entire interval A
(A−1)2 < p <
A−1
A . For
lower A-s the uniqueness may hold only in a sub-interval (as discussed in the proof in Appendix B.4).
13 The uniqueness result holds also for A < 4.6 but in a smaller interval as detailed Corollary 1 in Appendix
B.4.
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of payoﬀs among the diﬀerent types, but it turns out that this distribution is not stable
against small perturbations in the frequency of the incumbents.
Finally, if all non-naive players defect at horizon k1 + 1 against strangers, then it implies
that they all defect at horizon k1 + 2 against observed non-naive opponents, and the balance
between the payoﬀs of the diﬀerent types implies that the frequency of naive and non-naive
players is the same as in µ∗. Finally, we show that if k1 > 1, then the conﬁguration can be
invaded by mutants of type L1, who would outperform the incumbents by inducing more
mutual cooperation when being observed by the opponents.
4.4 Low and High p-s
Our main results (Theorems 1-2) characterized the unique stable conﬁguration in the interval
A
(A−1)2 < p <
A−1
A
. In this section we deal with the remaining intervals: low p-s (below A
(A−1)2 )
and high p-s (above A−1
A
), and show that the stable conﬁgurations are qualitatively diﬀerent
at these intervals. In both cases, stable conﬁgurations (if they exist) must include L∞ players
who, when facing L∞ opponents, defect at all stages.
When p is close to 0, this occurs because the indirect advantage of lower types is too
small and they cannot exist in a stable conﬁguration (because the probability of being
observed by the opponent is too low). When p is close to 1, there is an arms race between
sophisticated agents who observe each other: each such agent wishes to defect one stage
before his opponent. The result of this arms race is that in any stable conﬁguration there
must be L∞ agents in the population, and these L∞ players defect at the ﬁrst stage when
they observe a L∞ opponent. Table 2 summarizes this result, which is formalized as follows
(see proof in Appendix B.5):
Theorem 3. Let A > 4.6, δ > 0 be suﬃciently small, λ < 1 be suﬃciently large, and
assume early-reciprocity. Let (µ, β) be a proper neutrally stable strategy.
1. Let p < A
(A−1)2 . Then µ (L∞) = 1 and everyone defects at all stages.
2. Let A
(A−1)2 < p <
A−1
A
. Then (µ, β) ≈ (µ∗, b∗).
3. Let A−1
A
< p ≤ 1. Then µ (L∞) > 0, and L∞ agents always defect against observed L∞
opponents.
A Comparison With Dekel, Ely, and Yilankaya (2007)'s Stability
In our notion of stability, the state of the population speciﬁes the behavior of the incumbents
also against external mutants. Dekel, Ely, and Yilankaya (2007) present an alternative
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Tab. 2: Characterization of Proper Evolutionarily stable Conﬁgurations
Interval
Example
(A = 10)
Characterization of Proper
Evolutionarily stable Conﬁgurations
0 < p < A
(A−1)2 1% < p < 12% Necessary condition: only µ (L∞) = 1.
A
(A−1)2 < p <
A−1
A
12% < p < 90%
(µ∗, b∗) - Naive (L1) and moderately
sophisticated agents (L3) co-exist.
A−1
A
< p < 1 90% < p ≤ 1 Necessary condition: µ (L∞) > 0.
notion according to which the state of the population only speciﬁes the behavior of players
against incumbents, and the behavior against external mutants is determined by a post-
entry adaptation process.14 In this appendix we describe Dekel, Ely, and Yilankaya (2007)'s
notion, and show that our results remain qualitatively similar with this notion.
Dekel, Ely, and Yilankaya (2007) assume that the adaptation process according to which
agents choose their strategies is much faster than the evolutionary process according to
which the frequency of the types evolves. Thus, they assume that the post-entry population
adjusts their play to an exact BayesNash equilibrium immediately after mutants enter the
population. Let a compact conﬁguration be a pair consisting of a distribution of types and the
strategy that each type uses against strangers and other incumbents (but behavior against
external mutants is unspeciﬁed). A compact conﬁguration (µ, β) is (strictly) DEY-stable if:
1. Strategy proﬁle β is:
(a) A BayesNash equilibrium in the Bayesian game with the distribution of types µ.
(b) Balanced - it induces the same payoﬀ to all types in C (µ).
2. For each type Lk ∈ L, there exists a suﬃciently small 0 such that for each  < 0,
after  mutants of type Lk invade the population:
(a) There exist post-entry BayesNash equilibria in which the incumbents' play is
only slightly changed relative to the pre-entry play.
(b) In all these equilibria the mutants are (strictly) outperformed by the incumbents.
14 A similar approach is used in the notions of mental equilibrium (Winter, Garcia-Jurado, and Mendez-
Naya (2010)) and evolutionarily stable types (Alger and Weibull (2012)). Both notions apply only to ho-
mogeneous populations that include a single type, and thus are not appropriate to deal with stability of
heterogeneous populations.
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With simple adaptations, Lemmas 1-5 apply also for DEY-stability. This immediately im-
plies that (µ∗, b∗) is strictly DEY-stable, and that it is qualitative unique under the early
reciprocity assumption. That is, any other DEY-stable conﬁguration satisﬁes similar quali-
tative properties: (1) naive agents (type L1) and moderately sophisticated agents (types in
the set {L2, L3, L4}) co-exist, and (2) higher types (L5 and above) do not exist. Formally:
Proposition 1. Let max
(
1
A−2 ,
2·A−1
A·(A−1)
)
< p < A−1
A
, let δ > 0 be suﬃciently small, let
λ < 1 be suﬃciently large, and assume early-reciprocity. Then the compact conﬁguration
(µ∗, b∗) is strictly DEY-stable. Moreover, any other DEY-stable conﬁguration (µ, b) satisﬁes:∑
k≤4 µ (Li) = 1, and 0 < µ (L1) < 1.
15
In this setup we only have the weaker qualitative uniqueness because Lemmas 6-7, which
are required for full uniqueness, do not hold. The lemmas fail because DEY-stability does
not consider what happens as a result of a small perturbation to the:
• strategies played by the incumbents (part 1 of both lemmas), as DEY-stability im-
plicitly assumes that the incumbents immediately adjust back to their previous play
(which remain BayesNash equilibrium).
• frequencies of the diﬀerent incumbent types (part 4 of Lemma 7), as DEY-stability only
allows mutants to have a single type, while such perturbations can only be represented
by entry of heterogeneous mutants.
Finally, we note that if one adapts DEY-stability by: (1) allowing non-external mutants to
have several types, and (2) assuming that the adjustment to a new exact equilibrium takes
place only after the entry of external mutants, then all of our results, including the full
uniqueness would hold.
B Proofs
Throughout the proofs we use dk to denote the following behavior of an informed agent: play
grim if the horizon>k, and defect if horizon≤ k . Note the for an informed agent of type
Lk, all behaviors dm for m ≥ k are equivalent, as such an agent never encounter an horizon
larger than k. In all the results we assume that δ > 0 is suﬃciently small, and that λ < 1 is
suﬃciently large.
15 Note that the interval max
(
1
A−2 ,
2·A−1
A·(A−1)
)
< p < A−1A is increasing in A, it converges to the entire
interval [0, 1] in the limit A→∞, and it is non-empty for each A > 3.4.
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B.1 Neutral Stability Implies Balanced BayesNash Equilibrium
Proposition 2. Let (µ, β) be a neutrally stable conﬁguration. Then, the strategy proﬁle
β: (1) induces the same payoﬀ for each type in the support of µ, and (2) is a BayesNash
equilibrium in the Bayesian game with distribution of types µ.
Proof.
1. Assume to the contrary that β induces diﬀerent payoﬀs to diﬀerent types. Let Lk ∈
C (µ) be the type with the highest payoﬀ. Then u ((Lk, βk) , (µ, β)) > u ((µ, β) , (µ, β)).
This implies that for suﬃciently small  > 0, mutants of type Lk who play βk achieve
a strictly higher payoﬀ than the incumbents and this contradicts the stability.
2. Assume to the contrary that β is not a BayesNash equilibrium. Let Lk ∈ C (µ) be
the type who does not play a best response against (µ, β). This implies that there
exists strategy β
′
k such that u ((Lk, β
′
k) , (µ, β)) > u ((Lk, βk) , (µ, β)). By the ﬁrst
part of the proposition, u ((Lk, βk) , (µ, β)) = u ((µ, β) , (µ, β)). This implies that for
suﬃciently small  > 0, mutants of type Lk who play β
′
k obtain a strictly higher than
the incumbents and this contradicts the stability of (µ, β).
B.2 Stability of (µ∗, b∗)
Theorem 1. Let A
(A−1)2 < p <
A−1
A
. Then conﬁguration (µ∗, b∗) is evolutionarily stable.
Proof. In order to prove that evolutionary stability, we ﬁrst show two auxiliary results:
(µ∗, b∗) is balanced (Lemma 1), and b∗ is a BayesNash equilibrium (given µ∗) that is strict
with respect to on-equilibrium path deviations (Lemma 2).
Lemma 1. Conﬁguration (µ∗, b∗) is balanced.
Proof. Let q = µ (L1). Agent of type L1 gets (T− 1) · A + 1 against L1 opponent and
(T− 2) · A+ 1 against L3 opponent. Agent of type L1 obtains (T− 2) · A+ (A+ 1) + 1 =
(T− 1) · A + 2 against L1, and against L3 opponent he gets: (T− 3)A + 3 if both players
identify each other, (T− 3) · A + (A+ 1) + 2 = (T− 2) · A + 3 if only he identiﬁes his
opponent, (T− 3) ·A+ 0 + 2 if only his opponent identiﬁes him, and (T− 2) ·A+ 2 if both
players identify each other. Denote by δ3 = δ · c (L3) the cognitive cost of type L3. The
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diﬀerent types get the same payoﬀ if:
q · ((T− 1) · A+ 1) + (1− q) · ((T− 2) · A+ 1) + δ3 = q · ((T− 1) · A+ 2) + (1− q) ·(
p2 ((T− 3)A+ 3) + p (1− p) (((T− 2) · A+ 3) + ((T− 3) · A+ 2)) + (1− p)2 ((T− 2) · A+ 2))
(1− q) ((T− 2)A+ 1− ((T− 3)A+ 1 + 2p2 + p (1− p) (A+ 2 + 1) + (1− p)2 (A+ 1)))+δ3 = q
q = (1− q) · (A− (2p2 + p (1− p) (A+ 3) + (1− p)2 (A+ 1)))+ δ3
q = (1− q) (A− (p2 (2− A− 3 + A+ 1) + p (A+ 3− 2A− 2) + (A+ 1)))+ δ3
q = (1− q) (A− (p (1− A) + (A+ 1))) + δ3
q = (1− q) (−p (1− A)− 1) + δ3 = (1− q) (p (A− 1)− 1) + δ3
q (p (A− 1)− 1 + 1) = p (A− 1)− 1 + δ3
q =
p (A− 1)− 1 + δ3
p (A− 1) . (B.1)
Note that for each p > 1
A−1 we get a valid value of 0 < q < 1.
Lemma 2. Strategy proﬁle b∗ is a BayesNash equilibrium given the distribution µ∗. More-
over: (1) playing grim until the last three stages is also the best reply of informed mutants of
higher types, and (2) any deviation that induces a diﬀerent play on-equilibrium path yields a
strictly worse payoﬀ.
Proof. For large enough λ < 1, it is immediate that playing grim is a best reply for an
uninformed agent. In what follows we focus on informed agents. We have to show that (1)
Playing d2 against observed L1 opponents and strangers, and playing d3 against observed
non-naive opponents is a best reply of all informed agent (including informed mutants with
types Lk with k > 3); and (2) deviations on-equilibrium path are strictly worse. It is
immediate that d2 is a best reply against an observed naive opponent, and strictly better
than all on-equilibrium path deviations. Next, we show that playing d2 against a stranger is
strictly better than playing d3. This is true if the following inequality holds (looking at the
payoﬀs of the last 3 rounds, as all preceding payoﬀs are the same):
q · (2A+ 2) + (1− q) · (2p+ (1− p) · (A+ 2)) > q · (A+ 3) + (1− q) · (3p+ (1− p) · (A+ 3))
q · (A− 1) > (1− q) ⇔ q > 1
A
.
B Proofs 18
Using (B.1) one obtains:
p · (A− 1)− 1
p · (A− 1) >
1
A
⇔ p · A · (A− 1)− A > p · (A− 1)
p · A2 − p · A− A > p · A− p ⇔ p · (A2 − 2A+ 1) > A ⇔ p > A
(A− 1)2 .
It is then immediate that d2 is also strictly better (against strangers) than any other deviation
on-equilibrium path (also when a mutant agent is informed earlier about the realized length).
We are left with showing that playing d3 is strictly better than playing d4 against an observed
non-naive opponent (and this immediately implies that d3 is also strictly better than any
deviation on-equilibrium path also of a mutant which is informed earlier about the realized
length). This is true if the following inequality holds (focusing on the payoﬀs of the last 4
rounds, as preceding payoﬀs are equal):
p · (A+ 3) + (1− p) · (2A+ 3) > p · (A+ 4) + (1− p) · (A+ 4)
(1− p) · (A− 1) > p ⇔ A− 1 > A · p ⇔ p < A− 1
A
.
We now use the lemmas to prove that (µ∗, b∗) is evolutionarily stable. That is, we have to
show that after an invasion of  mutants with conﬁguration (µ, β) ((µ, β) 6≈ (µ∗, b∗)), the
incumbents obtain a strictly higher payoﬀ than the mutants in the post-entry population
(for suﬃciently small  > 0).
First, consider mutants of types L1 or L3. If these mutants play diﬀerently against
incumbents (strangers, L1 or L3) than do their incumbent counterparts on-equilibrium path,
then they are strictly worse oﬀ by the previous lemmas. Note that when the proportion of L1
agents becomes larger (smaller) relative to its proportion in µ∗, then the L1 agents achieve
a lower (higher) payoﬀ than the L3 agents. This is because L1 agents obtain a strictly lower
payoﬀ than L3 agents when facing L1 opponents (L3 players obtain an additional ﬁtness
point by defecting when the horizon is equal to 2). This implies that mutants of types L1 or
L3 who play the same as their incumbent counterparts on-equilibrium path, obtain a strictly
lower payoﬀ than the incumbents (unless these mutants have the same distribution of types
as the incumbents, and, in this case, they obtain the same payoﬀ).
Next, consider mutants of diﬀerent types (L2 or L4 or higher). Mutants of type L2
achieve a strictly lower payoﬀ against incumbents: they have the same payoﬀ as L3 in most
cases, but they obtain a strictly lower payoﬀ when they observe an opponent of type L3 due
to their inability to defect at horizon 3. Mutants of higher types (L4 or more) obtain at
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most the incumbents' payoﬀ when facing incumbents (as discussed before, L3's strategy is
a best-reply also when being informed earlier about the realized length), while they have a
strictly larger cognitive cost (δ · c (L4)). Thus these mutants achieve a strictly lower payoﬀ
than the incumbents. Finally, mutants may gain an advantage from a secret handshake-
like behavior (Robson (1990)) - playing the same against incumbent types and strangers,
while cooperating with each other when observing a mutant type (diﬀerent from L1 and L3).
However, for suﬃciently small , such an advantage cannot compensate for the strict losses
mentioned above, and this implies that any conﬁguration of mutants would be outperformed
by the incumbents.
B.3 Properness of (µ∗, b∗)
We ﬁrst show that (µ∗, b∗) is a proper conﬁguration.
Proposition 3. Let A
(A−1)2 < p <
A−1
A
. Then conﬁguration (µ∗, b∗) is proper.
Proof. Let the sequence of interior n-proper conﬁgurations (µ
n, βn) that converge to (µ∗, b∗)
be deﬁned as follows (for brevity we only sketch the main details of the construction). Each
external mutant Lk /∈ {L1, L3} has µn (L2) = O (n), while µn (L1) = µ (L1) − O (n) and
µn (L3) = µ (L3) − O (n). With probability of 1 − O (n) all types play grim when being
uninformed, and when being informed they play d2 against strangers and L1 opponents,
and play d3 against other observed opponents. Agents play all other pure strategies with
probabilities of O (n) or smaller magnitudes in a way that is consistent with n-properness.
Observe that such a conﬁguration is n-proper, and this implies the properness of (µ
∗, b∗).
B.4 Uniqueness of (µ∗, b∗)
Theorem 2. Let A > 4.6, A
(A−1)2 < p <
A−1
A
, and assume early-reciprocity. Then if (µ, β)
is a proper neutrally stable conﬁguration, then it is equivalent to (µ∗, b∗).16
Theorem 2 follows immediately from Lemmas 3-7. First, Lemma 3 shows that proper
neutrally stable conﬁguration must include more than one type in their support, and the
lowest type must be at most M − 1. Formally:
Lemma 3. Let (µ, β) be a conﬁguration such that β is a BayesNash equilibrium given µ.
Let 0 < p. Let type Lk1 ∈ C (µ) be the smallest type in the population. Then:
1. Everyone defects (with probability 1) at any horizon weakly smaller than k1.
16 If A < 4.6, Theorem 2 holds if p satisﬁes: max
(
1
A−2 ,
2·A−1
A·(A−1)
)
< p < A−1A or p < 1− 2·A−1A2−A .
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2. Any type Lk 6= Lk1 in the population defects (with probability 1) at horizon k1 + 1.
3. If µ (Lk1) = 1 then the conﬁguration is not neutrally stable.
4. If k1 = M then the conﬁguration is not neutrally stable.
5. µ (Lk1) < 1 and k1 ≤M − 1.
Proof.
1. It is common knowledge that all types are at least k1. This implies that defecting when
the horizon is at most k1 is the unique strictly dominance-solvable strategy. Thus, all
players must defect with probability 1 when the horizon is at most k1 given any signal
about the opponent.
2. Part (1) implies that defecting is strictly better than cooperating at horizon k1 + 1.
3. Observe that if k1 < ∞, then  mutants of type L∞ who enter the population and
play dk1+1 strictly outperform the incumbents. If k1 = ∞, then for suﬃciently large
λ, mutants of type L1 will strictly outperform the incumbents, because they induce at
least T − 2 rounds of mutual cooperation when their nativity is being observed (due
to the properness requirement).
4. If the lowest type in the population is LM , then L∞ agents strictly outperform agents
with type LM−1 and the conﬁguration cannot be neutrally stable.
5. It is immediately implied by the previous parts.
Remark 6. Note that if λis not close enough to 1 (and this threshold is decreasing in p and
converges to 1 as p→ 0), then the conﬁguration in which all agents have type L∞ and they
always defect can be a proper evolutionary stable.
Given a conﬁguration with more than one incumbent, we call the lowest incumbent type
naive, and all other incumbents are dubbed non-naive types. Let a cooperative opponent
be an opponent who has not defected so far in the game. The following lemma shows that
if everyone cooperates at all horizons strictly larger than k1 + 1 in a proper neutrally stable
conﬁguration, then this conﬁguration must be equivalent to (µ∗, b∗).
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Lemma 4. Let p < A−1
A
, let (µ, β) be a proper neutrally stable strategy, and let type Lk1 ∈
C (µ) be the smallest type in the population. Assume that µ (Lk1) < 1, k1 ≤ M − 1, and
all types in the population cooperate at all horizons strictly larger than k1 + 1 when facing
cooperative strangers. Then:
1. No one defects at a horizon strictly larger than k1 + 2 against any incumbent.
2. µ (Lk1+1) = 0 and all non-naive incumbents play dk1+1 against strangers or observed
types Lk1, and they play dk1+2 against any non-naive observed incumbents (up to oﬀ-
equilibrium path deviations).
3. No incumbent has a type strictly larger than Lk1+2 (if k1 + 1 = M , let k1 + 2 :=∞).
4. The population only includes types {Lk1 , Lk1+2}, and:
µ (Lk1) =
p (A− 1)− 1 + δ · (c (Lk1+2)− c (Lk1))
p (A− 1)
for any p > A
(A−1)2 , and no neutrally stable conﬁguration exists if p <
A
(A−1)2 .
5. If p > A
(A−1)2 , then (µ, b) and (µ
∗, b∗) are equivalent conﬁgurations.
Proof.
1. We have to show that playing dk1+2 is strictly better than an earlier defection against
an observed non-naive incumbent. This is because defecting at horizon k1+3 (defecting
at a horizon strictly larger than k1 + 3) yields A− 1 (at least 2 · (A− 1)) fewer points
than dk1+2 against an unobserving opponent and at most 1 (2) more points than dk1+2
against an observing opponent. Thus dk1+2 is strictly better than defecting at a horizon
of at least k1 + 3 if:
(1− p) · (A− 1) > p ⇔ (A− 1) > A · p ⇔ A− 1
A
> p.
2. By part (2) of the previous lemma all non-naive incumbents play dk1+1 when facing
strangers or observed Lk1 . It is immediate that dk1+2 is strictly better than defecting
at a horizon of at most k1 + 1 when facing an observed non-naive incumbent. By the
previous part, any incumbent with a type strictly larger than Lk1+1 plays dk1+2 against
observed non-naive incumbents. In order to complete the proof we have to show that
all non-naive incumbents have type diﬀerent than Lk1+1. Assume to the contrary
that: (I) all non-naive incumbents have type Lk1+1; this implies that mutants of type
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L∞ who play dk1+2 against non-naive incumbents and dk1+1 against strangers or naive
incumbents outperform the incumbents; or (II) some of the non-naive incumbents have
type Lk1+1 while other incumbents have higher types; then for suﬃciently small δ > 0,
the latter group outperforms the former.
3. Assume to the contrary that there are players of a type strictly higher than Lk1+2.
If there are also incumbents of type Lk1+2 then the previous part shows that both
groups play the same on-equilibrium path, and thus the agents with the strictly higher
types must obtain strictly lower payoﬀs due to the cognitive costs. Otherwise, any
best-reply mutant type Lk1+1 must play dk1+1 against strangers and naive incumbents
(or an equivalent strategy that only diﬀers oﬀ-equilibrium path), and this implies that
in any proper conﬁguration, non-naive incumbents cannot defect at horizons strictly
higher than k1 + 2 when facing an observed mutant type Lk1+1. This implies that such
mutants outperform the incumbents due to the cognitive costs.
4. C (µ) = {Lk1 , Lk1+2} is immediate from the previous two parts. In any balanced con-
ﬁguration the naive and the non-naive incumbents must have the same payoﬀ. By re-
peating Lemma 1's calculations, this implies that µ (Lk1) =
p(A−1)−1+δ·(c(Lk1+2)−c(Lk1))
p(A−1) .
By repeating Lemma 2's calculations, this conﬁguration cannot be stable if p < A
(A−1)2 .
5. If Lk1 = L1 then the previous parts imply that (µ, β) ≈ (µ∗, b∗) are equivalent conﬁgu-
rations. Assume to the contrary that k1 > 1. We now show that  mutants of type L1
who invade the population outperform Lk1 incumbents (and this immediately implies
that the mutants also outperform the incumbents of type Lk1+2, as the post-entry dif-
ference in the payoﬀs between the incumbents is O ()). When facing an opponent of
type Lk1 , the mutants obtain one less point. When facing an unobserving opponent of
type Lk1+2, both types L1 and Lk1fare the same. When facing an observing opponent
of type Lk1+2, the mutants obtain at least A − 1 more ﬁtness points (by inducing a
sophisticated opponent to postpone his defection). Thus the mutants outperform if:
µ (Lk1) < p·(A− 1)·µ (Lk1+2) = p·(A− 1)·(1− µ (Lk1)) ⇔ µ (Lk1) <
p · (A− 1)
1 + p · (A− 1) .
By the previous part:
µ (Lk1) =
p (A− 1)− 1 + δ · (c (Lk1+2)− c (Lk1))
p (A− 1) <
p · (A− 1)
1 + p · (A− 1) ,
where the last inequality holds for a suﬃciently small δ > 0.
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We now have to deal with the remaining case in which only a fraction of the non-naive
players cooperate at all horizons strictly larger than k1+1 when facing a cooperative stranger.
First, Lemma 5 shows that the frequency of the naive players is small, and that these naive
players must have type L1, and that if p is not too small, then the population must include
also types L2 − L4 but no higher types.
Lemma 5. Let (µ, β) be a proper neutrally stable strategy, and let type Lk1 ∈ C (µ) be the
smallest type in the population. Assume that µ (Lk1) < 1, k1 ≤ M − 1, and that there are
agents who defect at horizons larger than k1 + 1 when facing cooperative strangers. Then:
1. µ (Lk1) ≤ 1A .
2. If p > 1
(A−1)2 , then Lk1 = L1.
3. If p > 2·A−1
A·(A−1) , then µ (L2) > 0.
4. If µ (L2) > 0 and
A−1
A
> p > 1
A−2 then:
(a) No incumbent defects at horizons > 3 when facing cooperative strangers.
(b) No incumbent defects at horizons > 4 when facing any cooperative incumbent.
(c) No incumbent has a type strictly higher than L4.
Proof.
1. The fact that there are incumbents who defect with positive probability at horizons
strictly larger than k1 + 1 against strangers implies that early defection (at horizon
strictly larger than k1 +1) yields a weakly better payoﬀ than dk1+1 against cooperative
strangers. Early defection at horizon k1 + 2 (>k1 + 2) yields at least A−1 (2 · (A− 1))
fewer ﬁtness points against naive agents, and at most 1 (2) more points against non-
naive opponents. This can hold only if:
µ (Lk1) · (A− 1) ≤ (1− µ (Lk1)) · 1 ⇔ µ (Lk1) ≤
1
A
. (B.2)
2. Assume to the contrary that k1 > 1. Observe that  mutants of type L1 outperform
the incumbents of type Lk1 (and thus outperform all the incumbents in the post-entry
conﬁguration) if: p · (A− 1) · (1− µ (Lk1)) > µ (Lk1) · 1. This is because the mutants
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of type L1 earn at least A − 1 more points when their type is observed by a non-
naive incumbent, they earn the same when their type is not observed by a non-naive
incumbent, and they earn at most 1 less point when playing against a naive incumbent
(type Lk1). Thus the mutants achieve a strictly higher payoﬀ if:
p · (A− 1) > µ (L2) · (1 + p · (A− 1)) ⇔ p · (A− 1)
1 + p · (A− 1) > µ (L2) .
Substituting (B.2) yields:
p · (A− 1)
1 + p · (A− 1) >
1
A
⇔ p · A · (A− 1) > 1 + p · (A− 1) ⇔ p > 1
(A− 1)2 .
3. Assume to the contrary that µ (L2) = 0. Balance implies that the naive players (L1)
must have the same payoﬀ as the non-naive players. This can hold only if:
p · (A− 2) · (1− µ (L1)) < (1− p) · (1− µ (L1)) · 2 + µ (L1) .
This is because naive players obtain (on average) at least A − 2 more ﬁtness points
when their type is observed by a non-naive opponent (as they induce their opponent
to cooperate at least one more round), and non-naive agents get at most 1 more
point against a naive opponent and at most 2 more points against a non-observing
sophisticated opponent. Thus:
(p · (A− 2)− 2 · (1− p)) · (1− µ (L1)) < µ (L1) ⇔ (p · A− 2) · (1− µ (L1)) < µ (L1)
(p · A− 2) < µ (L1) · (p · A− 1) ⇔ µ (L1) > p · A− 2
p · A− 1 .
Substituting (B.2) yields:
1
A
>
p · A− 2
p · A− 1 ⇔ p · A− 1 > p · A
2 − 2 · A ⇔ p · A2 − (2 + p) · A+ 1 < 0.
The last inequality holds if and only if p > 2·A−1
A·(A−1) , a contradiction.
4. Let µ (L3+) = 1− µ (L1)− µ (L2).
(a) Balance implies that types L1 and L2 obtain the same payoﬀ. This can hold only
if:
p · µ (L3+) · (A− 1) < µ (L1) + µ (L2) + (1− p) · µ (L3+) .
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This is because type L1 obtains A − 1 more ﬁtness points against an observing
opponent of type L3 or higher, while type L2 obtains 1 more point against types
L1 and L2 and at most 1 more point against an unobserving type L3 or higher.
Thus:
p · µ (L3+) · (A− 1) < 1− µ (L3+) + (1− p) · µ (L3+) = 1− p · µ (L3+)
p · µ (L3+) · A < 1 ⇔ µ (L3+) < 1
A · p.
This implies, together with (B.2):
µ (L2) = 1− µ (L1)− µ (L3+) > 1− 1
A
− 1
A · p =
A · p− p− 1
A · p .
From the same argument as in part (1) of this lemma, if µ (L2) >
1
A
then no
incumbent defects at a horizon strictly larger than 3 when facing cooperative
strangers. Substituting this inequality yields:
1
A
<
A · p− p− 1
A · p ⇔ p < A · p− p− 1 ⇔ p >
1
A− 2 .
(b) The proof repeats the argument of part (2) of Lemma 4.
(c) The proof repeats the argument of part (3) of Lemma 4.
Lemma 6 shows that: (1) a large fraction of non-naive players cooperate at all horizons
strictly larger than k1 + 1 when facing cooperative strangers, (2) if p < 1 − 2A−1A2−A then no
incumbent defects at a horizon strictly larger than k1 + 2 when facing cooperative strangers,
and (3) no incumbent has a type higher than Lk1+3.
Lemma 6. Let p < 1− 2A−1
A2−A , let (µ, β) be a proper neutrally stable strategy, let type Lk1 ∈
C (µ) be the smallest type in the population, and assume the that µ (Lk1) < 1 and k1 ≤M−1.
Let η be the mean probability that a non-naive incumbent cooperates at all horizons strictly
larger than k1 + 1 when facing a cooperative stranger. Assume that η < 1. Then:
1.
η >
(A− 1) · (1− p)− 1
(A− 1) · (1− p) .
2. No player defects at horizon > k1 + 2 when facing cooperative strangers.
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3. No player defects at horizon > k1 + 3 when facing cooperative incumbents.
4. No player in the population has a type strictly larger than Lk1+3.
Proof.
1. Type Lk1 gets (T− 1) ·A+1 points when playing against itself. A random player with
a type diﬀerent than Lk1 who plays against Lk1 gets at most (T− 1) ·A+1+1 when he
observes his opponent's type, and an expected payoﬀ of at most η · ((T− 1)A+ 2) +
(1− η) · ((T− 2) · A+ 3). This implies that a necessary condition for other types to
achieve a higher payoﬀ (on average) when playing against L1 than the payoﬀ that L1
gets against itself is (subtracting the equal amount of (T− 2) ·A+1 from each payoﬀ):
A < p · (A+ 1) + (1− p) · (η · (A+ 1) + 2 · (1− η))
A < 1 + p · A+ (1− p) · (η · A+ 1− η) ⇔ A− 1
1− p < η · A+ 1− η
A− 1− 1
1− p < η · (A− 1) ⇔ 1−
1
(A− 1) · (1− p) < η
(A− 1) · (1− p)− 1
(A− 1) · (1− p) < η. (B.3)
If (B.3) does not hold, then the conﬁguration cannot be naturally stable, because a
suﬃciently small group of mutants with type L1 who invade the population and play
d1 would outperform the incumbents.
2. We show that when facing strangers, all types cooperate with probability 1 at all
horizons strictly larger than k1 + 2. Assume to the contrary that there is a type who
defects with positive probability against cooperative strangers at horizon l > k1 + 2.
This implies that defecting at horizon l yields a weakly better payoﬀ against strangers
than dk1+2. This can occur only if:
η · (1− p) · (A− 1) ≤ (1− η) + η · p.
This is because if l = k1 + 3 (l > k1 + 3), dk1+2 yields A− 1 (at least 2 · (A− 1)) more
points against non-observing opponents who cooperate at all horizons larger than k1+1,
and it yields at most 1 (2) fewer points against any other opponents. Thus:
η · (1− p) · (A− 1) ≤ 1− η · (1− p) ⇔ η · (1− p) · A ≤ 1 (1− p) ⇔ η ≤ 1
(1− p) · A.
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Substituting (B.3) yields:
(A− 1) · (1− p)− 1
(A− 1) · (1− p) ≤
1
(1− p) · A ⇔ A · ((A− 1) · (1− p)− 1) ≤ A− 1
A · (A− 1) · (1− p)− A ≤ A− 1 ⇔ A · (A− 1) · (1− p) ≤ 2 · A− 1
1− p ≤ 2 · A− 1
A · (A− 1) ⇔ p ≥ 1−
2 · A− 1
A2 − A ,
and we get a contradiction to p < 1 − 2·A−1
A2−A . By part (2) of Lemma 3, all non-naive
incumbents defect with probability 1 at any horizon of at most k1 + 1. This implies
that η of the non-naive incumbents play dk1+1 against cooperative strangers and the
remaining fraction plays dk1+2 .
3. The proof repeats the argument of part (2) of Lemma 4.
4. The proof repeats the argument of part (3) of Lemma 4.
The following corollary is immediately implied by Lemmas 3-6:
Corollary 1. Let
max
(
1
A− 2 ,
2 · A− 1
A · (A− 1)
)
< p <
A− 1
A
or 0 < p < 1− 2 · A− 1
A2 − A ,
let (µ, β) 6≈ (µ∗, b∗) be a stable proper neutrally stable conﬁguration, and let Lk1 ∈ C (µ) be
the lowest incumbent type (naive). Then:
1. µ (Lk1) < 1.
2. All non-naive incumbents either play dk1+1 or dk1+2 against cooperative strangers.
3. µ (Lk) = 0 for every k > k1 + 3.
4. If p > 1
(A−1)2 then k1 = 1.
Remark 7. Note that if A > 4.6 then
max
(
1
A− 2 ,
2 · A− 1
A · (A− 1)
)
< 1− 2 · A− 1
A2 − A ,
which implies that Corollary 1 is valid in this case for each p < A−1
A
.
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Finally, Lemma 7 shows that the conﬁgurations characterized by Corollary 1 cannot be
proper neutrally stable (unless it is equivalent to (µ∗, b∗)). To simplify notation, the lemma
describes the case in which Lk1 = L1 but it works the same (only with more cumbersome
notations) for Lk1 > L1 (which is possible when p <
1
(A−1)2 ).
Lemma 7. Let 0 < p < A−1
A
, let (µ, β) be a conﬁguration satisfying: (1) 0 < µ (L1) < 1, (2)
µ (Lk) = 0 ∀k > 4, and (3) a positive fraction of non-naive incumbents play d3 against coop-
erative strangers, and the remaining non-naive players play d2 against cooperative strangers.
Then (µ, β) cannot be proper neutrally stable.
Proof. Assume to the contrary that (µ, β) is a proper neutrally stable conﬁguration.
1. All players who play d2 against cooperative strangers have type L2.
Assume to the contrary that there is a type Lk˜ (k˜ > 2) that plays d2 with positive
probability against strangers (and by the previous lemma it plays d3 with the remaining
probability). Consider the following conﬁguration of mutants ,(µ′, b′), which as the
same distribution of types as the incumbents, and play like the incumbents except
when mutant of type k˜ faces a cooperative stranger: (1) µ′ = µ , (2) for each k 6= k˜,
b′k = bk, (3) for each Lk ∈ L, b′k˜ = bk˜ except that the mutants of type k˜ play d3
against cooperative strangers. Observe that such mutants strictly outperform the
incumbents: mutants of a type diﬀerent than Lk˜ obtain the same payoﬀ as their
incumbent counterparts, while mutants of type Lk˜ achieve a strictly higher payoﬀ
when facing an unobserved opponent of type Lk˜ (pre-entry, both d2 and d3 yielded
the same payoﬀ; post-entry, there are a few more early defectors and thus d3 yields a
strictly higher payoﬀ), and obtain the same payoﬀ in all other cases. This implies that
the conﬁguration cannot be neutrally stable.
2. β is characterized as follows: Uninformed agents follow any early-reciprocal behavior.
Informed agents play as follows: L1 agents play d1; L2 agents play d2; L3 agents
play d2 against observed L1 and d3 in all other cases; and L4 agents play d2 against
observed L1, d3 against strangers and observed L2, and d4 against observed L4 or L3
(all strategies are determined up to oﬀ-equilibrium path deviations that do not change
the observable play).
The strategies used against strangers are determined by the previous part and by
Lemma 3. The strategies used against observed incumbents are best replies if p < A−1
A
by the same argument as in part (1) of Lemma 4.
3. µ (L3) = 0.
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By a similar argument to part (2) of Lemma 4, agents of type L4 outperform agents
of type L3 due to their unique ability to play d4 against an observed type L3 or L4.
4. To simplify notation we characterize the frequency of each type in the case where the
cognitive costs converge to 0 (δ → o). The arguments work very similarly (but the
notation is more cumbersome) for small enough δ > 0. Then:
µ (L1) =
1
A+ p · (1− p) · (A− 1)2 , µ (L2) = 1−
1 + A− p · (A− 1)
A+ p · (1− p) · (A− 1)2 ,
µ (L4) =
1
p · (A− 1) + 1 .
Let µk = µ (Lk). The fact that (µ, b) is a balanced conﬁguration implies that types
L1 and L2 should have the same payoﬀ. Type L2 obtains 1 more ﬁtness point against
types L1 and L2, the same payoﬀ against an unobserving type L4, and A − 1 fewer
points against an observing type L4. The balance between the payoﬀs implies:
(1− µ4) = µ4 · p · (A− 1) ⇔ µ4 = 1
p · (A− 1) + 1 . (B.4)
Similarly, L2 and L4 should have the same payoﬀ. Type L2 obtains 1 less point against
type L2, the same number of points against observed type L1, A−1 more points against
unobserved type L1, and the comparison against an opponent of type L4 depends on
observability: A − 2 more points when both types are observed, 1 less point when
both types are unobserved, 2 fewer points when only the opponent is observed, and
A − 1 more points when only the opponent is observing. Thus, the balance between
the payoﬀs implies:
(1− p) · µ1 · (A− 1) + µ4 ·
(
p2 · (A− 2)− (1− p)2 + p · (1− p) · (A− 1− 2)) = µ2
(1− p) · µ1 · (A− 1) + µ4 ·
(
p2 · (A− 3)− 1 + 2p+ (p− p2) · (A− 3)) = µ2
(1− p) · µ1 · (A− 1) + µ4 · (p · (A− 3)− 1 + 2p) = µ2
(1− p) · µ1 · (A− 1) + µ4 · (p · (A− 1)− 1) = µ2 = 1− µ1 − µ4
µ4·p·(A− 1) = 1−µ1·(1 + (1− p) · (A− 1)) ⇔ µ4·p·(A− 1) = 1−µ1·(A− p · (A− 1))
µ1 · (A− p · (A− 1)) = 1− µ4 · p · (A− 1) ⇔ µ1 = 1− µ4 · p · (A− 1)
A− p · (A− 1) .
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Substituting (B.4) yields:
µ1 =
1− p·(A−1)
p·(A−1)+1
A− p · (A− 1) =
1
p·(A−1)+1
A− p · (A− 1)
µ1 =
1
(p · (A− 1) + 1) · (A− p · (A− 1)) =
1
A+ p · (1− p) · (A− 1)2 .
This implies that:
µ2 = 1− µ1 − µ4 = 1− 1
(p · (A− 1) + 1) · (A− p · (A− 1)) −
1
p · (A− 1) + 1
µ2 = 1− 1 + A− p · (A− 1)
(p · (A− 1) + 1) · (A− p · (A− 1)) = 1−
1 + A− p · (A− 1)
(p · (A− 1) + 1) · (A− p · (A− 1))
µ2 = 1− 1 + A− p · (A− 1)
A+ p · (1− p) · (A− 1)2 .
If any of the µi-s is not between 0 and 1 then no neutrally stable conﬁguration exists.
5. The conﬁguration is not neutrally stable.
A direct algebraic calculation reveals that for suﬃciently small , ′ > 0:
(a) If p < 0.5 then  imitating mutants (who play the same strategies as the in-
cumbents) with conﬁguration (µ′, b′) with µ′ (L1) = 1 − µ (L4) + ′, µ′ (L2) = 0,
µ′ (L4) = µ (L4) − ′, and b′ = b (play the same as the incumbents) outperform
the incumbents in the post-entry population.
(b) If p > 0.5  imitating mutants with a conﬁguration (µ′, b′) with µ′ (L1) = 0,
µ′ (L2) = 1−µ (L4)+′, µ′ (L4) = µ (L4)−′, and b′ = b outperform the incumbents
in the post-entry population for suﬃciently small .
B.5 Stable Conﬁgurations Near 0 and 1 - Theorem 3
Parts 1 of Theorem 3 is immediate from Remarks 6 and 7, and from Corollary 1. Part 2 is
immediate from Theorems 1-4. We have to prove part 3:
Theorem. 3. (part 3): Let A−1
A
< p ≤ 1. Then in any proper neutrally stable conﬁguration,
(µ, β), µ (L∞) > 0, and L∞ players defect at all stages when observing an L∞ opponent.
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Proof. Let Lk be the highest type in the population. Let l be the largest horizon in which Lk
agents begin defecting with positive probability against an observed cooperative opponent
of the same type. If this probability is strictly less than 1, then by a similar argument to
part (1) of Lemma 7, the conﬁguration is not neutrally stable ( imitating mutants who
diﬀer only in that the Lk mutants play dl with probability 1 against observed Lk opponents,
would outperform the incumbents). Now, if l < k, then  mutants of type Lk who play dl+1
(start defecting one stage earlier) against observed Lk, and play the same as the incumbents
in all other cases, outperform the incumbents of type Lk (and this implies they outperform
all incumbents) if:
p > (1− p) · (A− 1) ⇔ p · A > (A− 1) ⇔ p > A− 1
A
(because the mutants obtain 1 more point when their Lk opponent observes their type, and
they get at most A−1 fewer points when he does not observe their type; they obtain the same
payoﬀ against strangers and other observed opponents). For similar reasons, if l = k < ∞,
then  mutants of type L∞ who play dk+1 against observed Lk, and play the same as the
incumbents of type Lk in all other cases, outperform incumbents of type Lk (and this implies
they outperform all incumbents) in any proper neutrally stable conﬁguration.
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